UPDATE October 28, 2026: This story has been updated to correct when Marie Gluesenkamp Perez flipped District 3.

Ballots have been mailed to Washington residents, and the will take place on Nov. 3.听

Between critical contests across the country, prominent gubernatorial races and divisive ballot initiatives, there will be plenty to watch on Election Day. All 435 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives and 35 Senate seats are up for a vote. Democrats need a net gain of four seats in the House and four seats in the Senate to overturn the Republican majorities in both.

UW News spoke with and , professors of political science at the 黑料老司机, about midterm election trends, what they鈥檙e watching statewide and nationally, and more.

What will you be watching most closely in Washington state and/or nationally?

James Long: On the state level, is very competitive. Incumbent Marie Gluesenkamp Perez, a Democrat, won the district by about 4 points in 2024, having flipped it from Republican to Democrat control in 2022. This year, she is running against a Republican candidate, state senator John Braun. While all congressional races have a certain degree of localism and variation in candidate quality with respect to what matters in close races, should Gluesenkamp Perez hold onto the seat 鈥� and by a healthy margin 鈥� that could be a bellwether for how Democrats expect to perform in close House races nationwide. Similarly, if Braun flips the district back to Republican control, it could suggest that Republican losses across the country may not be as bad as many expect.

There are in Washington, all of which are controversial and speak to some current “culture war” divisions between the left and the right. I don’t have a sense of which of these initiatives will succeed or fail 鈥� polling on them is notoriously difficult. Voters may change their minds due to exposure to a variety of ads. They may also decide by reverting to how they view national conversations around parents’ involvement in educational curriculum, trans athletes in K-12 schools, and greater taxation of the wealthy in terms of whether and how they vote on these measures.

Mark Smith: In Washington, I鈥檓 particularly interested in the three ballot initiatives, especially . The state legislature is counting on the revenue from this tax in 2028. If the tax is repealed, the legislature will need to make major changes in their projected budget, with downstream effects for the UW.听

Nationally, I鈥檓 closely watching the competitive , partly because that鈥檚 where I鈥檓 from, but also because Ohio tells the tale of the changing geography of American politics. Ohio used to be considered a bellwether state, and it was the tipping-point state as recently as 2004. If John Kerry won Ohio, which he lost by only 2.1%, he would have been elected president. Since then, Ohio has trended strongly red. If Democrats win the Senate and governor鈥檚 races there, and polls have them favored in both, that would be a noteworthy result. If Democrats can win Senate seats in other red states such as Kansas, Iowa, Alaska and Texas, that would also grab my attention.听

What are the factors likely to impact voter behavior in these midterms?

JL: For Congressional races nationwide, this election really seems to be a referendum on Donald Trump and Republican control of Congress. It’s been a period of single party control across the executive and legislative branches, so it’s not unusual for the incumbent president and party to be the main focal point in a midterm election. Moreover, Trump’s and the Republicans’ policies are deeply unpopular with the American people, including the war with Iran, tariffs and the inability to tackle affordability.

MS: At the risk of sounding pedantic, it鈥檚 highly variable from person to person. Who people vote for, and whether they vote at all, is driven by a complicated combination of factors. Still, we can parse out some systematic effects that apply more generally. One of them is the dropoff in voter turnout of about 20% between presidential and midterm years. Twenty years ago, the kinds of people who always vote in midterm years were disproportionately voting Republican. Now they are disproportionately voting Democratic. Another way of saying that 鈥� based on the off-year elections in 2025 and the polling we have this year 鈥� is there will be more people who voted for Donald Trump in 2024 and don鈥檛 vote in 2026. That鈥檚 opposed to people who voted for Kamala Harris in 2024 and will stay home in 2026.

What patterns tend to emerge historically in midterm elections, and do you predict those patterns will hold this year?

MS: Since the time of World War II, the president鈥檚 party has lost an average of about 26 seats in the House and four seats in the Senate. But now regional polarization and gerrymandering have reduced the number of competitive House races, so it鈥檚 unlikely that Democrats will reach that average of 26 seats. But they only need to gain four to take the majority of the House. In the Senate, curiously, they need the same net gain of four seats to reach a majority. Current polling and prediction markets indicate that Democrats are likely to get there for both the House and Senate 鈥� though it鈥檚 somewhat less likely with the Senate. The fact that Republican PACs and committees are redirecting money toward states and districts they would normally win handily suggests that they fear a blue wave.

JL: It’s not just about whether there is a 鈥渂lue wave鈥� in Congress, which many observers are predicting. The margin of that seat gain and the margins of victory within districts also helps measure the depth of pro-Democratic Party support, or anti-Republican sentiment, which I believe will inform candidates from both parties who are thinking of running in the 2028 presidential cycle.

What issues currently appear to be most important to voters?

JL: Affordability, affordability, affordability. Joe Biden, Kamala Harris and the Democrats were unpopular in 2024 because inflation had not declined enough according to voters. Two years later, inflation is now growing at a higher rate than it was when Trump took office. A host of other policies, such as oil prices resulting from the U.S. attack on Iran and Trump’s tariffs, have hit the pocketbooks of every American, including those in rural areas who supported Trump and Republicans in 2024.听

It’s not so much that the Democrats have provided an alternative set of policies that voters find popular as it is that Trump and the Republicans are the focal point and it’s a brand whose stock has been declining of late.听

Moreover, candidates like Jon Ossoff 鈥� who is running for Senate reelection in Georgia and is a 2028 presidential candidate contender 鈥� have gained popularity by tying the affordability crisis to Trump and those in his orbit. While everyday Americans have seen wages flatten and costs rise, Trump, his family and his allies have grown enormously wealthy at the same time.

MS: One good source of data is the Gallup organization, which regularly asks Americans, 鈥淲hat do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?鈥� , the answers in order were the government/poor leadership (30%), high cost of living/inflation (13%), economy in general (11%), immigration (10%) and war in the Middle East (7%). The first three of those and the fifth clearly favor Democrats, with the fourth 鈥� immigration 鈥� hard to discern without more information. You don鈥檛 want to be the party in power when the government is perceived to be performing poorly and high prices are making even the essentials unaffordable for many people.

There have been as President Donald Trump has expressed his desire to exert more control. How serious are these potential threats?

MS: He on his biggest chance to exert more control, through restricting voting by mail. Some version of that proposal could come back, because the Supreme Court did not foreclose it entirely, but not in 2026. Anyone who lived through Jan. 6, however, would be foolish to say, 鈥淚t can鈥檛 happen here.鈥澨�

There has been speculation about President Trump sending federal law enforcement agents to polling places, or asserting widespread fraud and confiscating ballots or polling equipment after the election is held. Such an outcome becomes more likely if the election overall, or in certain important places, is very close. However, I would not rule it out even for a wave election. He could also take other, harder-to-predict actions to affect the results.

JL: I think explicit threats, and Trump has historically and in this cycle made them, should always be taken seriously. Whether or not they are successful is another matter. Trump and some Republican allies have attempted measures to restrict voting, suppress turnout, control mail-in ballots, and more, but have mostly been stopped so far by the courts, and the strategies don’t seem to be working. It mostly seems half-baked, but so did the “fake elector” scheme in 2020 that led to the riot, so protecting electoral integrity always requires eternal vigilance.

No doubt should Trump and the Republicans receive a “” 鈥� as President Barack Obama famously admitted when the Democrats suffered heavy losses in Congress in 2010 鈥� he will call the result “rigged” and likely spread misinformation about the election’s integrity. He appears ready to contest results, as . He has learned this is a costless way to avoid admitting defeat and it remains popular among his MAGA base. That said, evidence of any vote tampering should be investigated and, if it comes to it, adjudicated by the relevant judicial authority.

For more information, contact Lauren Kirschman at lkirsc@uw.edu.

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There鈥檚 still time to return your ballot for the 2026 general election, but if you鈥檙e planning to vote by mail, you may want to hurry. That鈥檚 according to a research brief 听by a team led by the 黑料老司机, which found that ongoing changes to U.S. Postal Service mail processes could double the percentage of ballots that arrive too late to be counted.听

Researchers estimate the mail delays could cause tens of thousands of otherwise valid ballots to be rejected. These mail delays disproportionately impact rural voters and those in outlying suburban communities.听

鈥淭his could affect 20,000 or more voters who put their ballots in the mail ahead of election day,鈥� said research lead , professor of public policy and governance at the UW. 鈥淭hat may sound like a small number of voters in the grand scheme of things, but it could be really consequential, particularly in rural and outer suburban communities.鈥�

The research brief 鈥� part of a led by the UW Evans School of Public Policy and Governance 鈥� has not yet been peer-reviewed. Researchers plan to submit it to an academic journal in the coming months.听

State law requires every ballot postmarked by Election Day to be counted. That system relied on the Postal Service鈥檚 practice of postmarking mail on the date it鈥檚 received. But new policies first rolled out in October 2023 shifted how the agency collects and processes mail.

Under the program 鈥� part of an 鈥� mail in ZIP codes more than 50 miles from a regional center is collected only once a day. That mail may not be postmarked until it reaches a processing facility, which could be the next day or even later.

RTO was implemented in about two dozen Washington ZIP codes in February 2024 and has since been expanded to . Rural voters are particularly likely to live in an RTO ZIP code, including over 90% of rural voters who voted in the 2024 general election.

To project the delays鈥� effects on ballot rejection rates, researchers analyzed voter-level ballot data and county-level rejection data from the Washington Secretary of State. They found that between 2020 and 2025, about 11% of primary ballots and nearly 5% of general ballots were postmarked before Election Day, but not received until after. While counted in past elections, these last-minute ballots are those most likely to be impacted this year.

Researchers also found that the late ballot rejection rate has risen significantly since RTO was implemented in 2024. Across Washington, the county average late ballot rejection rate was 1.1% in the 2025 general election 鈥� about twice as high as the typical rate in general elections. In that election, the ballot rejection rate for voters in RTO ZIP codes was 3.2%, more than double the rate for those in urban areas.听

滨迟鈥檚 difficult to project exactly how many voters are at risk of having their ballots rejected in 2026, but Allard said he expected the number to rise.

鈥淚 think we鈥檙e at risk of having 1% to maybe even 1.5% of all ballots rejected for being late due to postal service delays, which would be unprecedented statewide,鈥� said Allard, who is the Daniel J. Evans Endowed Professor of Social Policy.

He encouraged voters to consider using or putting their ballots in the mail at least a week before Election Day, which this year is Tuesday, November 3. Voters taking ballots to the post office also can ask their postal worker to postmark their ballot envelope on the spot.

鈥淚t shouldn鈥檛 fall only on the voters to solve this problem,鈥� Allard said, 鈥渂ut there are steps we can all take to ensure our ballots are received on time.鈥澨�

Co-authors include , UW doctoral student of sociology; , UW doctoral student of public policy and governance; and of the University of California, Berkeley.听

For more information or to reach the researchers, contact Alden Woods at acwoods@uw.edu.听

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滨迟鈥檚 not unusual for students to ask why he鈥檚 so dressed up for class, but his answer often takes them by surprise.

Goldman, a teaching professor of chemistry at the 黑料老司机, often goes directly from work to meetings for his other position: for Lake Forest Park, a suburb of Seattle. He鈥檚 been a council member since 2022 and is currently serving his second term, which runs through 2029.

Science came naturally to Goldman. He decided to major in chemistry during an Advanced Placement class in high school and chose to teach as a postdoctoral scholar, but his venture into civics was 鈥渕ore serendipitous.鈥� When a friend on the council first approached him with the idea in April 2021, Goldman all but scoffed.

鈥淭hat鈥檚 not my personality,鈥� he said. 鈥淚鈥檓 not the most gregarious person. I tend to be much more analytical, so I wouldn鈥檛 have envisioned myself being a politician. I also think there is a stereotype that you have to have studied political science or you have to be a lawyer to be in politics. I鈥檓 a chemistry teacher.鈥�

But Goldman鈥檚 friend insisted he only needed to be passionate about the community to be an effective council member. A month later, he decided to run. In order to run for office in Lake Forest Park, a person must only be a registered voter of the city and have lived there at least one year.

鈥淚 think my friend was completely correct in that each council member brings a different scope,鈥� Goldman said. 鈥淚 really took that to heart. Some people are more experienced in land use while others know construction design or finances or can analyze data.鈥�

Lake Forest Park covers an area of 3.4 miles in King County. The city has an estimated population of 13,630 as of the 2020 Census. More than 18% of the population is aged 65 and over, while 21% of the population is 21 and under.

Goldman’s focus is on environmental issues and public transit. Lake Forest Park tends to be car-centric, Goldman said, so his goal is to make it easier for people to bike or walk to transit.听 He doesn鈥檛 own a car, so he commutes to work at the UW by bus.听

鈥淭here is no reason to be pigeonholed,鈥� Goldman said. 鈥淭here is no reason for people to think, 鈥極h, I鈥檓 in science and you鈥檙e in politics and those two things are totally separate.鈥� Scientific literacy is critical for the general population.鈥�

Goldman has also found overlap in the skills he uses for his two roles. While professors teach individually, they collaborate on topics like course ideas, textbooks and changing the curriculum.

鈥淎 lot of the decisions in the chemistry department are made through mutual consensus,鈥� Goldman said. 鈥淚 bring that mindset to the city council. There will be some disagreements, but it鈥檚 the same process of: Where does everyone start from? What are we already in agreement on? What do we need to reach an agreement?鈥�

Sitting on the council has also given Goldman a more complete understanding of what it takes to manage a budget, which has helped him grasp the operational and capital expenses in the chemistry department and the College of Arts & Sciences.

By sharing about his path with students, Goldman hopes to illuminate career options outside the traditional chemistry track. Many graduates remain in academia or pursue pre-med or similar paths, but there is a lot of middle ground, Goldman said. Students could consider going into law or using their chemistry knowledge to become a professional consultant.

鈥淭here are a lot of alternative approaches,鈥� Goldman said. 鈥淎nd having politicians who are knowledgeable about science will make any science-related legislation that much more effective. I want to encourage people not to separate science from politics.鈥�

As for Goldman, his political ambitions end here. You won鈥檛 see him campaigning for any county or state posts.

鈥淵ou wouldn’t be the first person to ask,鈥� Goldman said. 鈥淗onestly, it took a bit of arm-twisting to get me to run in the first place. This is not a stepping stone. I’m happy in my own little quiet neck of the woods.鈥�

For more information, contact Goldman at goldmanl@uw.edu.

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Dacca, a UW alumnus who has served as Director for State Relations for the past nine years, takes the place of Randy Hodgins who is retiring.

“Joe鈥檚 expertise in advocacy, his deep understanding of the region’s policy landscape, and his commitment to building strong relationships both inside and outside the University make him uniquely positioned to step into this new role at this moment,” Cauce said. “His leadership comes at a critical time for the University amidst a leadership transition and an increasingly complex political landscape.”

Dacca鈥檚 career reflects a dedication to public service. Prior to the UW, Dacca served as federal District Director for former U.S. Rep. Derek Kilmer (D-Port Angeles), Deputy District Director for former U.S. Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Bremerton), and as a legislative assistant in the Washington State Senate.

“I am grateful to President Cauce for the opportunity to serve my alma mater in this important role and I am honored to continue to work alongside the talented and dedicated External Affairs team,” Dacca said. “Building on the foundation led by Vice President Randy Hodgins, we will continue to strengthen partnerships both inside and outside the University and work collaboratively to advance the UW鈥檚 dynamic, public-facing mission.”

Morgan Hickel will assume the role as Interim Director of State Relations on July 1.

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Presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump enter Election Day and facing tight battles in the swing states.

Millions of people have already voted early, but the remainder of Americans will cast their votes on Tuesday. Before the results start rolling in, UW News asked three 黑料老司机 professors of political science to discuss what鈥檚 on their minds heading into the general election鈥檚 final hours.

, professor of political science

I’m looking at two specific predictions. The first is whether one candidate has (more or less) a clean sweep of the swing states or whether they (more or less) tie and divide the electoral college votes from the swing states. The swing state polling is effectively tied, suggesting that the latter scenario is more likely. But what if the polling is systematically overestimating or underestimating one candidate鈥檚 popularity? I suspect this is the case, and that either Harris or Trump will sweep the swing states.

If I’m right, the second prediction involves: Which candidate will sweep? I suspect it is more likely that Harris would be the candidate to sweep over Trump. There is a lot of different types of evidence out there showing the polls are likely underestimating her support or over-estimating Trump’s. There is no evidence to suggest that the polls are underestimating Trump’s support or overestimating hers 鈥� but of course, they could be, and this is all reading tea leaves. I wouldn’t be that surprised if the swing states are more divided, and there is still the possibility that Trump could sweep them.

We will get lots of vote counts in by Tuesday night from Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia, which will help us to see some trends.

, professor of political science

Like everybody else who feeds on the听IV drip known as the presidential election’s horse race coverage, I will be monitoring Pennsylvania 鈥� the swingiest of swing states.

I will be looking for any evidence that Trump’s attempts to mobilize young men without college degrees by blitzing non-traditional media such as podcasts and securing endorsements from figures like Elon Musk made a big impact. I will also be watching to see whether turnout on the Republican side is influenced by President Biden’s off-the-cuff remarks about Trump’s supporters being garbage, whether he intended to say that or not.

I will also be looking for any evidence that Vice President Harris’s efforts to mobilize women around abortion and reproductive rights and against Trump’s misogynistic听language and behavior made a huge impact. Similarly, whether her overtures to suburban Republican women and Independents听with the aid of surrogates like Liz Cheney helped her cause.

There are other hypotheses that are up for testing:

Is the great re-sorting of the parties along educational lines 鈥� and cutting across other cleavages such as race, ethnicity and region 鈥� the big thing some analysts think it is? Will immigration really drive voters to the polls, particularly to vote for Trump in large听numbers?

Will voters’ memory of 20% cumulative inflation since 2021, sky-high housing prices and relatively high interest rates be as salient as some analysts believe? Or will more recent trends of enduring economic strength and a soft landing stop the momentum toward Trump on the economy?

Finally, if Harris wins, is it because she executed an incredibly difficult feat with exceeding discipline? Did she successfully manage to reinvent her image in a few short months, credibly transforming into a centrist security hawk who prizes unity and bipartisanship despite significant听baggage from her 2019 Democratic presidential primary flameout? In other words, was she able to shed her image as a hyper-progressive Bay Area liberal and come across as a unifier who appeals to folks across the political spectrum? If she wins, I am going to be looking for data that supports this thesis, because it will say a lot about American politics and the parties going forward.

, teaching professor of political science

This election presents difficult circumstances for the Democratic Party. In other elections across western democracies, incumbent governments have been defeated badly by voters angry about inflation and the other dislocations of the pandemic. The American election being a coin flip suggests that some different issues might be in play in the American context.

Recent,听suggesting that Iowa 鈥� a state Trump easily carried in 2016 and 2020 鈥� is close because of a major shift among women voters. This suggests that the overturning of Roe v. Wade because of former President Trump’s three nominations to the Supreme Court is making the election more competitive.

The decision of Iowa Republicans to pass a near-total abortion ban in a pro-choice state is the obvious explanation, and the abortion issue is one obvious reason that the outcome of the听election is so uncertain.

For more information or to reach one of the faculty members, contact Lauren Kirschman at lkirsc@uw.edu.

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With the presidential election just weeks away, American political divides have once again taken center stage. While this chasm is most often attributed to disagreements on social issues, a new book argues otherwise.

鈥溾�� focuses on how former President Donald Trump 鈥� like other populists that came before him 鈥� exploits what the authors call 鈥榠nnovation inequality鈥�. Trump has been successful, they argue, because Americans are split between highly innovative and less innovative regions, or because of the gap between areas that are more technologically advanced and those that aren鈥檛. The book analyzes the origins and political implications of these divides.

Written by and , the book forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. Menaldo is a 黑料老司机 professor of political science while Wittstock received his doctorate in political science from the UW this year.

UW News spoke with Menaldo to discuss his book, the upcoming election and Trump鈥檚 campaigns in 2016 and 2020.

What made you want to write a book on this topic?

Victor Menaldo: There were three motivations. The first is that I was not satisfied with the conventional explanations for why former President Donald Trump won in 2016 and lost in 2020. The second motivation is that all the explanations focused on Trump as an individual instead of a larger phenomenon 鈥� some people call it populism, but there are other names for it. If it wasn鈥檛 Trump, it would have been someone else. Third, I felt that the approaches I鈥檇 seen to explaining Trump鈥檚 success and then his failure were not very historic. There are instances of populism in the past that could shed light on this. 滨迟鈥檚 not just a recent thing.

People offer many different explanations for America鈥檚 political divides, but you write in the book that America is actually divided along economic lines. Can you explain this concept?

VM: There has always been a difference between less innovative and more innovative places. The more innovative places are areas like Silicon Valley or the North Carolina Research Triangle. These places are very technologically advanced in terms of clusters of universities, companies and other organizations that are really on the cutting edge of research and development and innovation. But these differences have always been a thing, since the very beginning of the republic. Right after colonialism, Boston, Philadelphia and New York City were like the Silicon Valleys of their day. That’s where a lot of the innovations around industrialization took place. But even though other places in the vicinity weren鈥檛 as technologically advanced, the gap between them in terms of their contributions to innovation and the country鈥檚 economic dynamism wasn鈥檛 as wide as it is today.

There have been populist movements throughout our history that nonetheless exploited that divide. For example, we talk in the book about , who was a populist at the turn of the 20th century. He was nominated three times by the Democratic Party and lost all three times. If you think about Bryan, a lot of that political movement was about how agriculture had been left behind by industrialization or rural areas had been forgotten. He didn鈥檛 make it explicit, but that was about the technology divide or what we call 鈥渋nnovation inequality鈥� in the book. Technological change was embedded in industrialization and some manufacturing centers got ahead while many rural areas fell behind.

What we think explains Trump phenomenon is that there’s been much more of a polarization economically between high-tech places, those that make big contributions to the globalized knowledge economy, and places that are more peripheral. 滨迟鈥檚 like comparing Silicon Valley to the agricultural regions of the Central Valley in California. There is just a very stark difference. It gets expressed socially or culturally as well, but the underlying roots are the economic and technological divide in terms of places鈥� differing contributions to innovation or cutting-edge industries.

What analysis do you offer in the book of Trump鈥檚 win in 2016 and loss in 2020?

VM: For 2016, we write about two sides. There is the negative side, where Trump was very antagonistic toward big tech, universities and the highly educated, skilled labor forces that are integral to those industries. One example is he spoke out against visas for skilled immigrants, so he burned bridges quickly with a lot of tech firms, tech workers and highly educated skilled workers in technologically advanced industries.

Then there is the other side of it. 滨迟鈥檚 not just aggravating the tech industry, it鈥檚 also appealing to folks that are not part of the knowledge economy by talking about things like coal, energy jobs, manufacturing or agriculture: industries that have probably not benefited as much from technological change. He鈥檚 speaking against big tech and appealing directly to folks who are not involved in those industries who might feel they were left behind.

What we find in 2020 is places that flipped from Trump to Biden were more technologically advanced areas 鈥� key counties that flipped in North Carolina, Georgia and Arizona became more technologically advanced in terms of their integration to the global knowledge economy in the previous four years.

What stands out to you about this election cycle?

VM: In some senses, Republicans have narrowed the gulf with tech firms. Not all of them, but some, such as Elon Musk鈥檚 alliance with Trump or venture capitalists who disagree with President Joe Biden鈥檚 policies. This polarization has also been reduced in some ways by Trump and vice-presidential candidate JD Vance speaking to select tech firms or sectors such as cryptocurrency. 滨迟鈥檚 almost like they read our book and were like, 鈥淥h, maybe we can co-opt some of these folks.鈥�

On the other hand, I do think presidential nominee Kamala Harris鈥� policies are very much in line with President Biden鈥檚 and Hillary Clinton鈥檚 policies regarding technology and are part in parcel of a now decades long 鈥溾�� transition: pro-high-skilled labor, pro-high-skilled immigration, pro-education, a lot of investment in green energy and so on. The Democratic Party hasn’t really changed all that much, as much as they鈥檇 like to appeal to their older blue-collar roots. But the one place they have changed, or at least returned to these roots, I think since President Biden, is being pro-technology but also pro-manufacturing in ways they were forced to by Trump. For example, a lot of the is focused on building semiconductor plants in the U.S. I think Biden was reacting to Trump鈥檚 appeal in the blue wall states like Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania.

So, what I see in this election is lessons learned by both parties. Trump learned that he can鈥檛 alienate all of tech. The Democratic side is saying they can be pro-Silicon Valley and innovation while also splitting the difference and talking about bringing back manufacturing jobs to the Rust Belt. In fact, at least in this regard the parties are less polarized than they were in either 2016 or 2020.

For more information, contact Menaldo at vmenaldo@uw.edu

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stole the name of his new class 鈥� an irony that isn鈥檛 lost on him, considering the subject matter.

The name of the course, 鈥�,鈥� is a nod to 鈥�,鈥� a book that analyzes the methods the world鈥檚 despots use to stay in power. 滨迟鈥檚 required reading for the class, which Long designed and is teaching for the first time this quarter at the 黑料老司机.

鈥淚 want to set up for students why democracy is worth stealing and why it鈥檚 worth it for some leaders to try to cheat in an election,鈥� said Long, a professor of political science. 鈥湵醭兮�檚 because the value for the people that win is so high and important. There are more elections today around the world than there have been at any point in human history, and yet there are still all these persistent threats to realizing the democratic gains from those elections. When they鈥檙e undermined or rigged, elections can make democracy a lot worse.鈥�

The course, which has no prerequisites and is open to any student at the UW, also highlights the types of politicians who try to steal elections, and how and what can be done to secure them. While Long took inspiration for the course鈥檚 name from the book and similar titles used by colleagues who have studied election fraud in the past, he swapped the word 鈥渞ig鈥� with a word invoked more often today in the United States.

鈥溾�� was a rallying cry for supporters of former president Donald Trump on January 6, 2021, when a violent mob stormed the U.S. Capitol to try to prevent Congress from certifying the election outcome. Trump has also tried to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the 2024 election, claiming that the only way he could lose is if his opponents cheat.

A from The Washington Post/University of Maryland found that 62% of U.S. adults believe President Joe Biden was legitimately elected in 2020, down from 69% in 2021. Just 31% of Republicans believe the election was legitimate.

But when it comes to election interference in the United States, Long said, reality doesn鈥檛 match Trump鈥檚 claims. Long pointed to the between Trump and Hillary Clinton, which was influenced in ways Long said the U.S. wasn鈥檛 prepared for, or even aware of at the time.

鈥淲e don鈥檛 have direct evidence that the vote totals were changed, but we do know there was Russian influence into states鈥� election management systems, as well as disinformation spread online seeking to sow chaos and confusion for voters,鈥� Long said. 鈥淒id that swing the election? We don’t know the answer to that. We know it was a close election. We know that it was targeted to persuade voters to move in the direction of Trump.鈥�

As for 2020, Long called it 鈥渢he most secure election in U.S. history鈥� because intelligence agencies worked to fix exposed weaknesses, particularly at the state level.

鈥淒epending on your political perspective, you might think it鈥檚 the other way around 鈥� that 2016 was free and fair and 2020 was the one that was rigged,鈥� Long said. 鈥淏ut there鈥檚 no evidence that anything ran afoul in 2020. There are persistent threats, and they may become salient during certain election periods. U.S. elections are very secure in many ways, and we鈥檝e learned from the past, but there are all sorts of threats that remain.鈥�

One of those threats is the targeting of candidates, as evidenced by two recent attempts to assassinate Trump. While political violence isn鈥檛 new in the U.S. 鈥� past examples include the assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King. Jr, as well as the shooting of Ronald Reagan 鈥� it鈥檚 been decades since tensions ran this high.

Long said these threats have come from Trump himself, who joked in 2016 about somebody assassinating Hillary Clinton, encouraged brawls at his rallies and has already impugned the integrity of the vote by refusing to confirm that he will concede if he loses in November.

鈥淭his doesn’t mean we won’t have a secure election, but it does mean that threats to election integrity certainly persist in the U.S.,鈥� Long said. 鈥淔or somebody like Trump to not only occupy the office of the presidency and commit alleged crimes for which he鈥檚 been indicted, but who also wants to occupy the office again to avoid that legal liability, that is something that a lot of countries have faced and puts the U.S. in kind of a global perspective.鈥�

Long has been working on issues of election fraud since the , which was marred by allegations of rigging. A doctoral student at the time, Long was observing his first election outside the U.S. He went on to create a class on global crime and corruption, but realized there was an opportunity for a second course focused on election fraud specifically.

Among other topics, Long鈥檚 newest class will cover the , which international monitors called neither free nor fair as Nicol谩s Maduro, the incumbent, controlled most institutions and repressed political opposition.

The problems that arose in Venezuela reminded Long of issues he saw in Kenya, which he then worked with colleagues to overcome during elections . The class will explore these kinds of connections between elections.

鈥淚 knew I wanted to teach this course during a U.S. election because I wanted it to be a U.S.-global perspective,鈥� Long said. 鈥淚t would be an American classroom with Americans and non-Americans there, but people would be thinking about the world together rather than just the United States. There are a lot of different historical and contemporary cases to discuss. There really are a lot of different ways to steal an election.鈥�

For more information, contact James Long at jdlong@uw.edu.

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While social media platforms are rife with problems 鈥� from harassment to misinformation 鈥� many argue that the platforms also nurture political movements, such as the and .

But in her new book 鈥�,鈥� , a 黑料老司机 doctoral student in the Information School, argues that social media may not have much political value. Focused on movements on the political left, Cross looks at how platforms like X and Facebook might bring attention to political causes, yet they do little to cultivate lasting change. 鈥淭he idea that tech is political,鈥� Cross writes, 鈥渟ometimes obscures the ways in which social media may be anti-political.鈥�

UW News spoke with Cross about the book and why people simply logging off 鈥� spending less time on social media platforms 鈥� may be the best solution.

Your core argument is that social media platforms are fundamentally 鈥渁nti-political.鈥� Can you explain what you mean by that and why that is?

Katherine Cross: A wave of techno-optimism washed over us in the mid-to-late 2000s, which coincided with the rise of and contemporary social media. These new platforms no longer siloed you in forums or chat rooms. Instead, you were suddenly able to sort of tap a digital microphone and speak to the whole world at once, with no barriers. That made crowdsourcing a reality. We started to see major, leaderless protests , . We saw people going out onto the streets, organized in many ways by simply reading social media posts. It seemed almost like magic, like we had bypassed the old power networks and hierarchies of governments and big businesses and unions. This seemed to change the course of history when movements like the Arab Spring protests toppled governments.

But many of my own experiences in online activism made me begin asking what happens next. As I followed up on a lot of these protests, after the cameras went away, there seemed to be little durable change. Yes, governments fell. But the next generation of rulers that stepped in were the same sort of oligarchs as before. Does anyone really believe that Egypt’s current president is substantially ideologically different from Hosni Mubarak?

That鈥檚 the unfortunate story of a lot of these internet-fired movements. #MeToo is another example 鈥� the changes were considerably less durable than we had hoped. Time and again, people fixate on moments of individual justice, and they hope that those episodes stand in for collective, structural changes that are more significant and durable. The prosecution of Harvey Weinstein, for instance, was a doubtlessly an accomplishment of the #MeToo movement. Yet .

Crowdsourcing on social media gives the illusion of collective action and power, but it lacks the ability to direct the mass of people towards any kind of sustainable collective goal. You might be able to change one person, but you cannot actually change the world because crowdsourcing is not sustainable organization, and it cannot direct political power.

Do you see the same anti-political patterns playing out in right-wing movements?

KC: I do. Social media compels a fixation on the symbolic, on the gestural, on points of language and aesthetics 鈥� things that are much easier to debate on social media than matters of greater substance. The things we see catch fire are less nuanced policy debates and more like the nonsense that flared up around accepting that very brief sponsorship from Bud Light. The unbelievable hate directed against her was in many ways readymade for social media, because it was purely gestural and aesthetic. 鈥淚 don’t like this person because she’s trans. Let’s debate whether she’s a woman, let’s debate whether she fits into Bud Light鈥檚 core demographic, and then let鈥檚 ruthlessly pile on to her and anyone who defends her and attack the company to demand 鈥� what?鈥� Something nebulous, some vibe.

If you want to attack and try to destroy a person, or to be bigoted against a community by singling out a member of that community for abuse, social media is your best ally in that cause. And yet, those on the right also have their own collectivist visions. Some of them dream of a new Reich or perhaps they dream of . But they’re not going to get those things through social media posting.

You argue also that the new, decentralized social media platforms like Mastodon and Bluesky aren’t a solution to this broken model that Twitter made popular. What problems do you see with the new platforms and their attempts to fix the trouble with Twitter?

KC: The problem with a platform like Mastodon is that Twitter’s culture persists 鈥� the callouts, the cliquishness, the harassment campaigns, the prejudice. There are some additional speed bumps in the way of harassment, for instance, but Mastodon really just replicates a lot of the drama-mongering that Twitter became infamous for. I was on a trans-woman-led Mastodon, and it became subject to a lot of vicious drama from outside that led to the destruction of the server.

Bluesky is even more like Twitter, because even though it can be decentralized into various servers, almost everyone is still on bluesky.social, the primary server. So the experience is very similar to the firehose of content that you got on Twitter. It does overall have less prejudice 鈥� far fewer Nazis, which is wonderful. Certain marginalized communities have built a new home there. People are now able to create their own servers. That should lead to the full decentralization of the platform, making it less vulnerable to, say, a billionaire takeover, which is all for the good.

But I don’t know that we are going to solve the bigger problems using anything that even remotely resembles a Web 2.0 platform. I’ve started posting less on Bluesky, because I realized I was going back to this old place where I’m angry all the time and starting arguments with people. Instead, I’ve started focusing on talking to the people that I’ve met there off the platform or just responding to the posts that I can be pleasant to. But social media is meant to lull you into acting almost automatically, so the fact that you still have to consciously resist indicates that not too much has changed here yet.

That brings us to the title of the book 鈥� 鈥淟og Off.鈥� Can you explain why you arrived at that prescription?

KC: Every time I鈥檝e felt my perspective shifting for the better, it has come from spending less time on social media and more time reimmersing myself in my community. I also recognized that those of us who were privileged enough to be able to work from home throughout much of the pandemic ended up spending even more time on social media 鈥� the effects of which were resolutely negative. I saw people go down these rabbit holes of political radicalization and paranoia. I thought, 鈥淚 know you in person, this isn’t you.鈥� But they鈥檇 migrated much of their social life onto a platform that rewards this new, more toxic, hair-trigger self.

In preliminary research for my dissertation, several public health experts have told me that Twitter polarized their profession during the pandemic along lines drawn by social media. Historically, their discourse would have been good-faith, behind-the-scenes disagreements about things like transmission mechanisms. But during the pandemic, some of these researchers gained huge followings, and suddenly they had to please people who were expecting them to take a side. That made it harder for those experts to tell the truth as they saw it, or to adapt what they were saying to new evidence. Public health experts hoped to use Twitter to hold a free, graduate-level seminar for the world. But instead, suddenly, there were massive camps of fandom in the general public with signs and slogans and half-baked understandings of the minutiae of those academic disputes. So Twitter beefs began getting litigated in the physical world at conferences and universities.

All of this made me think the most effective solution that an individual can take is to spend less time on social media. Ask yourself very seriously: 鈥淚f I’m trying to use the platform for some political purpose, will it help achieve my goal? And how?鈥� If you can’t answer that question, in the affirmative, with details, then you should log off and find a different approach.

Is there anything you want to add?

KC: Social media provides a lot of momentary, individual emotional satisfaction, and it’s easy to mistake that for politics. These platforms encourage that individualization. Yes, you are the product, as the cliche goes, but you’re also this solitary unit being served. When that happens, you start wanting to satisfy your emotional needs over everything else. A lot of internet discourse about politics is about venting, the desire to feel heard. It’s very therapeutic. But while that may have some value, in a limited sense, it is deeply antithetical to real politics, because politics is never truly about the individual: 滨迟鈥檚 about the collective, the polity. But social media鈥檚 prioritizing of individual emotion is anathema to real organizing.

For more information, contact kcross1@uw.edu.

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In a speech to a group of religious broadcasters in February, to create a task force to counter 鈥渁nti-Christian bias,鈥� which he said would investigate the 鈥渄iscrimination, harassment and persecution against Christians in America.鈥�

滨迟鈥檚 Trump has claimed that Christians are being persecuted, and he鈥檚 not alone. As more politicians repeat these statements, researchers from the 黑料老司机 investigated whether anti-Christian bias claims can also be used as a racial dog whistle to signal allyship with white Christian Americans.

A dog whistle is coded language used in political messaging to garner support from a particular group by indirectly communicating about race. For example, the phrase 鈥渨elfare queens” was first presidential campaign to refer to individuals perceived as abusing the welfare system. The term was disproportionately associated with Black, single mothers, allowing politicians to disparage a marginalized group without directly mentioning race.

The UW study, , showed that white and Black Christians perceived a politician concerned about anti-Christian bias as caring more about anti-white bias, being more willing to fight for white people and as less offensive than one concerned about anti-white bias. Black, but not white, Christians saw a politician distressed by anti-Christian bias as less likely to fight for Black people.

The researchers also found that reading about anti-Christian bias led white Christians 鈥� but not Black Christians 鈥� to perceive more anti-white bias. Together, these results suggest that talking about anti-Christian bias can provide a more palatable way for politicians to signal allegiance to white people.

To learn more, UW News spoke with corresponding authors , a UW associate professor of psychology and , a UW postdoctoral research fellow of psychology, about their work.

What interested you about this area of research?

Marah Al-Kire: Most previous research on racial dog whistles has focused on dog whistles that communicate Blackness, but there鈥檚 not much that looks at indirect language that can communicate whiteness. One line of Clara鈥檚 research focuses on how and why , like men who claim bias against men and white people who report anti-white bias. Especially in the current political climate, we were interested in whether these bias claims, such as talking about anti-Christian bias, were inadvertently communicating something about race.

For example, we saw Donald Trump use Christian symbolism during the George Floyd protests when he had a photo op holding a Bible, which was a signal of Christian nationalism. We know that Christian nationalism 鈥� the belief that the United States is and should be a Christian nation 鈥� is highly associated with racialized attitudes, even though the items we use to measure it make no direct mention of race. The connection between white and Christian in the United States is pervasive. If I was talking about anti-Christian bias, it also triggers perceptions of anti-white bias because people make an automatic connection between 鈥渨hite鈥� and 鈥淐hristian.鈥�

Clara Wilkins: If you look at which group most strongly endorses the ideas of Christian nationalism, . 滨迟鈥檚 not a thing among all Christians; it鈥檚 a subset. For example, showing that people who endorse Christian nationalism have negative attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, and our colleague Sam Perry finds a similar association with . So clearly, there is a connection between race and religion that hasn鈥檛 been explicitly studied.

One of the things that causes Christians to see themselves as victimized is perceived social change. We know that perceptions of bias against Christians have , and so have politicians鈥� claims of the need to protect religious freedom. There seems to be an implicit racialization of religion, where politicians are using claims of religious persecution as racial dog whistles.

Why does anti-Christian bias work particularly well as a racial dog whistle?

MA: One reason is how perceptions of Americanness are tied to race. that white people are seen as more American. But we鈥檙e also currently finding evidence to suggest that 鈥淐hristian鈥� is operating in the same way that 鈥渨hite鈥� is. If you think about the Christian symbols that you see, Jesus is portrayed as white even though realistically, that鈥檚 not what Jesus would look like. At a cultural level and with historical iconography, there is a tight connection between whiteness and Christianity. In the United States, there is also a deeply rooted history of white supremacy within Christianity.

CW: There are many examples of . For example, slave Bibles 鈥� Bibles created specifically for enslaved populations 鈥� excluded portions that talked about liberation, books like Exodus, and instead focused on submission to authority. Many Confederate generals were ministers. Christianity has played a central role in the rationalization of racial subjugation in the American context.

One thing we write about in the paper is the fact that the United States was founded on the premise of religious freedom. Protecting a core value sounds great, right? 滨迟鈥檚 a lot more acceptable than a politician saying that they鈥檙e really looking out for white people, but our research suggests that is what people hear.

The paper features several quotes from Donald Trump. Can you explain how politicians like Trump use anti-Christian bias claims to appeal to their base? What can voters watch for as we approach the 2024 elections?

MA: People should pause and think about what politicians are saying, like bias against Christians and Christian-related issues, and what people are actually hearing. We couldn鈥檛 demonstrate intent in the paper. We were just focusing on what people hear. Someone like former vice president Mike Pence, who is obviously very religious, is probably actually trying to talk about anti-Christian bias. But inadvertently, especially among white voters, he鈥檚 signaling a commitment to them as well. Our study shows that when you describe anti-Christian bias, white people perceive anti-white bias. Black people do not do that. But Black people still recognize that it鈥檚 a dog whistle. So even though Black people aren鈥檛 saying that anti-Christian bias means anti-white bias, they still assume that politicians are using it strategically. From a politician鈥檚 standpoint, if you鈥檙e trying to appeal to communities of color 鈥� and a lot of Black communities are highly Christian 鈥� you鈥檙e still inadvertently signaling a lower commitment to Black communities.

CW: We鈥檝e been working on this research for years, and the original draft of the paper didn鈥檛 open with Trump quotes. This is a pattern of increasing claims of anti-Christian bias that has been going on for a while and Trump just jumped on the bandwagon. That said, our research doesn鈥檛 speak to whether Trump understands these patterns, but I imagine one thing he does know is that , which I think is likely due to appointing three conservative Christians to the Supreme Court and overturning Roe v. Wade. Trump says he’s not racist, but he uses a lot of racist language. In our society, being called racist is basically one of the worst things you could be called, right? So how does a politician create a racial appeal without saying something like, 鈥淲hite people need to band together?鈥� That鈥檚 the extreme. Far right politicians can do that, but mainstream candidates can鈥檛. Our paper shows that a politician can communicate racial concern by claiming anti-Christian bias.

Other co-authors were Chad Miller, UW doctoral student of psychology; of the University of Oklahoma; and of the University of Illinois Chicago.

For more information, contact Wilkins at claraw@uw.edu and Al-Kire at ralkire@uw.edu.

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黑料老司机 political scientists and have spoken and written extensively about politics in emerging democracies and 鈥� usually those other than the United States 鈥� check the power of their leaders, present and past.

Former President Donald Trump鈥檚 recent indictment poses existential challenges for an otherwise mature democracy like the United States: What are citizens willing to accept from their presidents, even once they鈥檙e out of office?

Menaldo and Long, both faculty in the UW Department of Political Science and co-founders of the , talked with UW News about how they frame these issues not only for the media and the general public, but also for their students. The conversation was edited for clarity.

听

Q: Watergate and President Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon have come up often in discussions of the Trump case. Does it make sense to compare them?

James Long: Regardless of what you think of Ford’s pardon, Nixon paid a price for his misdeeds: He had to resign and left office in disgrace, even if he was not then criminally prosecuted. At this point, Trump has not yet faced accountability, assuming he’s guilty at all, and in fact he could be rewarded through reelection, which was never possible for Nixon.

Then there鈥檚 a broader point on how you want to treat presidents when they’re in office or after. Pundits and lawyers say every citizen is equal under the eyes of the law. That may be true in principle, but at the same time a president is not like everybody else 鈥� they have certain duties to uphold. That doesn鈥檛 mean presidents should commit corrupt or criminal acts, but it does mean that they perform a different function than all other citizens.

We’ve put members of Congress, governors, city council members and all manner of politicians in jail. When people have been really concerned about a president’s actions and their legality, we have basically decided as a country, until now, that it’s not worth it: Reagan and George H.W. Bush on Iran-Contra; Bill Clinton and 鈥淟ewinsky-gate鈥�; George W. Bush for conduct in the war on terror. If what you care about is moving on, then you excuse the misdeeds, even possible crimes. You just hope that the person retires and you try to move on. The problem with Trump is that he wants to be president again.

Bad behavior on the part of previous presidents — when it鈥檚 been known 鈥� folks have decided to let it go in some broad sense. Now that’s changing. I think we’ve set a new precedent with Trump, and we have no idea what that means in the future.

听

Q: You鈥檝e written about other countries鈥� experiences, including those that have prosecuted leaders aggressively and those that have avoided it for various reasons. What are the issues that arise?

Victor Menaldo: Presidents are political animals by nature. They are called on to do things that are always potentially at the margin of illegality, especially around foreign policy, because in Jack Nicholson鈥檚 famous words: 鈥淎mericans simply can鈥檛 handle the truth.鈥� If you put presidents under a microscope, you will always find some basis for some kind of accusation.

So in response, there are two extremes: One is to put the microscope away and look the other way. The problem there is you incentivize bad behavior and end up with impunity. The second is to always use that microscope and magnify every little thing they do and encourage prosecutors to go after them with abandon. But if there鈥檚 an investigation every single time there is even the smallest iota of wrongdoing, then that’s going to create perverse consequences: A president will anticipate it, so they’re going to use their power to ward off prosecution or to stay in office so that they don’t see the jailhouse.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is a good example. He was once a staunch defender of the judicial branch in Israel 鈥� a rather vanilla type of conservative. But when he started to get in legal trouble, especially in 2019 when he was sitting prime minister and indicted for fraud and bribery, he became more of a populist who attacked the other branches of government. He tried to get his supporters to help him legally by delegitimizing Israel’s democratic institutions, especially courts. In fact, he’s trying to do that now that he’s returned to power, and he鈥檚 mastered how to peddle conspiracy theories and radicalize and polarize the country to try to take the legal heat off.

The U.S. might start to look more like an Israel, Peru or Brazil, where it’s politically difficult not to go after leaders, and so both political parties may magnify that microscope and hyper-scrutinize everything leaders do. Then leaders may be tempted, like Netanyahu and Trump toward the end of his time in office, to undermine institutions and laws that threaten their freedom. This has been a recipe for eroding democracy, such as in Bolivia during Evo Morales鈥� presidency.

Q: How do you incorporate Trump in your teaching?

VM: Trump鈥檚 case has allowed me to focus on two tools democracy provides to uphold the rule of law and make sure politicians behave well. One involves how you sanction them and the other involves the leaders you select in the first place. The latter is usually more powerful because if democracy is constructed well, you’ll select the right type of leaders who don’t want to misbehave, whose strategy is to please the people in ways that are legal, and that strive to improve life for the majority of citizens, to leave the country better than they found it.

I think Trump showcases the failure of this screening tool. It’s not about electing angels but about selecting politicians who at least want to do right, even if it’s for self-interested reasons, such as improving their popularity or burnishing their legacy. 滨迟鈥檚 about rejecting leaders who aren’t going to press every advantage, look for every opportunity to politicize the law or cripple their opponents, or undermine institutions, to gain short-run advantages.

We have taken for granted in this country how much we rely on the screening tool so we can avoid turning to the sanctioning one. If you select bad leaders, then you are in trouble, because prosecutors may be beholden to them or, if they are not, a politician鈥檚 supporters are going to try to discredit attempts to hold them accountable. Good screening therefore beats imperfect punishment, and Trump makes it easier to teach this lesson.

JL: The interesting thing to teach about Trump to undergrads in my current class on global crime and corruption is not only about Trump, but about the American presidency: the two things that the framers of the Constitution thought about and in part, but only in part, gave us solutions to.

The framers were mindful of the fact that you can’t just take whatever criminal statute you have and always apply that to the president. You have to allow the president broader powers, and you also have to allow the fact that they may do something that’s not technically illegal but which is unbecoming of the office of the presidency and undermines their constitutional discharge. Therefore they should be removed from office in a way that is different than how a person may be thrown in jail if found guilty of a crime. So they wrote 鈥渉igh crimes and misdemeanors鈥� in the constitution as an impeachable offense, which any impeachment article would have to define.

Secondly, they gave Congress this duty. They understood the balance of power would constrain the executive. They saw what Oliver Cromwell had done in the brief period when England didn鈥檛 have a monarch and they had their own revolution against King George. So they were fearful of a lawless executive and so part of Congress’ job is to limit presidential abuse of office.

But something the framers worried about but didn鈥檛 have a great solution to was how to avoid partisan interests in Congress that could undermine its impeachment powers. If people care more about being Democrats and Republicans than they do about asserting Congress鈥� role to stop an unruly president, or avoid overzealous and frivolous investigations, then the fact that this is Congress’ Constitutional prerogative doesn’t matter.

One thing the framers wouldn鈥檛 have anticipated is that the executive branch has essentially declared itself above the law. During the Nixon Administration, the Justice Department鈥檚 Office of Legal Counsel’s decision said that no sitting president can be criminally charged. This was upheld during the Clinton administration and formed the basis of Robert Mueller鈥檚 鈥渄eclination鈥� to prosecute Trump. To be clear, this is the executive branch, under the DOJ, providing legal and political cover to the head of that branch, the president, to do whatever they want. That鈥檚 the standard that we have right now 鈥� although the OLC opinion has not been tested in court, it throws the matter of a lawless president back to Congress.

Although Nixon never went through the impeachment process, it’s well documented that he resigned when Republican senators came to him and said he would not have the votes to survive conviction; and what about congressional Democrats and Republicans during Clinton鈥檚 impeachment and Senate trial, and both of Trump鈥檚? Are these all examples of Congress performing the function the framers invested them with, shirking responsibility or something else entirely?

For my students, thinking about dilemmas the framers considered and the solutions they provided, but also how in various ways those solutions have been perhaps undermined, is profoundly fascinating and interesting.

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